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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jason Jay Ward appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding him guilty of rape and his guilty plea to a persistent violator enhancement. 
Ward claims (1) fundamental error in relation to the prosecutor's impeachment of 
him pursuant to I.RE. 41 O; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) evidentiary error 
based on an alleged lack of foundation for the DNA evidence admitted at trial; 
and (4) cumulative error. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On May 21, 2011, Ward, his friend Colby Redgrave, and Redgrave's ex-
girlfriend, M.M., were at Ward's house one evening after boating earlier in the 
day. (Tr., p.102, Ls.4-6, p.105, L.6 - p.110, L.3.) During the course of the 
evening, Colby invited two female friends over, Sonia and her cousin. (Tr., 
p.110, L.13 - p.111, L.1, p.430, L.25 - p.431, L.9.) Sonia and her cousin stayed 
for a short time and then left. (Tr., p.431, L.17 - p.432, L.1.) 
At one point, M.M. and Redgrave went into one of Ward's bedrooms. (Tr., 
p.114, L.7 - p.115, L5.) M.M. testified that she and Redgrave talked about their 
relationship and M.M. was interested in reconciling. (Tr., p.115, Ls.6-12.) M.M. 
testified that, while in the bedroom with Redgrave, they kissed but she declined 
his efforts to have sex and went back out into the living room. (Tr., p.115, L.16 -
p.116, L.5.) Redgrave came out of the bedroom a few minutes later, "flipped 
[M.M.] the bird" and left. (Tr., p.116, Ls.6-11.) M.M. followed Redgrave outside 
because she was expecting him to give her a ride home. (Tr., p.116, Ls.12-17.) 
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M.M. waited a few minutes for Redgrave to come back to get her; when he did 
not, she left Ward's house, started walking, and tried to call her sister to come 
pick her up. (Tr., p.117, Ls.8-12.) M.M. said that, as she left Ward's, he told her 
he would give her a ride if she gave him $10.00 for gas. (Tr., p.117, L.24 -
p.118, L.4.) M.M. declined the offer because she "didn't feel comfortable around 
Jason Ward to begin with." (Tr., p.118, Ls.4-7) 
After M.M. had been walking for about "20 minutes or so," Ward pulled up 
in his truck and stopped her. (Tr., p.118, L.18 - p.119, L.7.) Ward opened the 
door of his truck and told M.M. to "get in" and then he got out wearing only a blue 
shirt - Ward was not wearing any pants or underwear. (Tr., p.119, Ls.8-22.) 
Ward then grabbed M.M. by the ponytail and made her get in the truck and told 
her to drink three cups of alcohol. (Tr., p.119, L.23 - p.121, L.5.) When M.M. 
spilled one of them, Ward hit her. (Tr., p.121, Ls.12-16.) 
Ward drove M.M. to a secluded location near a canal. (Tr., p.125, L.16 -
p.126, L.19.) There, Ward stopped his truck and "climbed over to the passenger 
seat and ... got on top of [M.M.]." (Tr., p.126, Ls.21-23.) M.M. asked Ward to 
get off of her and pushed him as he tried to kiss her and undo her pants. (Tr., 
p.127, Ls.1-10.) Unable to remove M.M.'s pants inside the truck, Ward pulled 
M.M. out of the truck by the wrist, got behind her and "tried to bend [her] over" 
and undo her pants again. (Tr., p.127, L.21 - p.129, L.3.) Again unsuccessful, 
Ward had M.M. lay on the ground. (Tr., p.129, Ls.10-14.) M.M. pushed and 
scratched Ward as he was on top of her. (Tr., p.130, Ls.10-17.) Ward 
eventually forced M.M.'s pants down and raped her. (Tr., p.131, L.11 - p.132, 
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L.15, .136, Ls.12-23.) During the sexual assault, Ward also choked M.M., 
pinched the insides of her thighs, and bit her. (Tr., p.134, L.20 - p.135, L.16, 
p.143, Ls.3-12.) After raping M.M., Ward removed his penis and started 
slapping M.M. on the stomach with it until he ejaculated. (Tr., p.137, Ls.2-11.) 
After Ward ejaculated, he walked to the front of his truck while M.M. sat 
crying, smoking a cigarette, and trying to think of a way to escape. (Tr., p.139, 
L.2 - p.139, L.21.) Ward approached M.M. a second time and said, "Get up. 
We're doing it again." (Tr., p.141, Ls.8-12.) Ward proceeded to have sex with 
M.M. a second time. (Tr., p.141, Ls.21-25.) The second time, Ward "pinched 
the inside of [M.M.'s] legs some more," "grabbed [her] hips," and "choked [her) 
again." (Tr., p.142, Ls.3-5.) Ward then made M.M. get back in the truck and 
drove her to a stop sign by some railroad tracks and told her to "get out." (Tr., 
p.144, L.14- p.145, L.19, p.148, L.25-p.149, L.10.) M.M. called her mom and 
911 and was transported to the hospital where she underwent a sexual assault 
exam. (Tr., p.150, Ls.5-20; see generally Tr., pp.307-345 (testimony of nurse 
who examined M.M., collected DNA evidence for the sexual assault kit and 
observed M.M.'s distraught demeanor and her injuries).) 
Law enforcement interviewed Ward later that day - May 22, 2011. (Tr., 
p.404, L.25 - p.405, L.21.) Deputy Jeff Haskell observed and photographed 
scratches on Ward's arms and back. (Tr., p.405, L.22 - p.406, L.10, p.407, 
L.22.) Ward claimed "he had been boating earlier in the day and that the water 
was choppy and he must have received them while he was boating" and 
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"mentioned something about coming in contact with the windshield of the boat." 
(Tr., p.408, Ls.2-4.) 
The state charged Ward with forcibly raping M.M. and alleged he is a 
persistent violator. (R., pp.34-35, 92-93.) Ward pied not guilty and the case was 
set for trial. On December 20, 2011, the day Ward's trial was to begin, Ward 
pied guilty. (Tr., pp.6-27; see R., pp.152-161.) Pursuant to an agreement with 
the state, Ward, who was represented by Doug Nelson, agreed to plead guilty to 
the charged offense in exchange for dismissal of the persistent violator 
enhancement and an agreed upon sentence of 15 years with seven years fixed 
to run concurrent "with the two prior convictions that he has." (Tr., p.6, L.19 -
p.7, L.2; R., pp.166-169.) 
Approximately one month later, Ward retained new counsel and two 
months after that, on February 29, 2012, Ward filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea with a supporting affidavit and memorandum. (R., pp.176, 185-200.) 
The court held a hearing on Ward's motion at which Ward and Nelson testified. 
(Tr., pp.29-78.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Ward's 
motion, finding Ward's guilty plea was entered based on erroneous legal advice. 
(Tr., p.73, L.25 - p.75, L.3.) Specifically, the court found that Nelson misstated 
the law when he told Ward that "he could go to the penitentiary on [his] felony 
DUI charge as a result of [the court) finding probable cause that he committed 
the offense of rape even if a jury acquitted him." (Tr., p.74, Ls.2-11.) This was a 
misstatement, upon which Ward relied, because the court could not use "conduct 
that occurs prior to a conviction to justify a probation violation" - in other words, 
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Ward could not violate his probation in his DUI case based on the rape charge in 
this case since the rape occurred prior to the DUI conviction. (Tr., p.74, Ls.8-18.) 
Upon granting Ward's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his case was scheduled 
for trial and the state filed a Second Amended Information again alleging rape 
and a persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p.76, Ls.5-8; R., pp.232-236, 239-
240.) Ward's defense at trial was that M.M. consented to have sex with him and 
asked him to bite and choke her. (See generally Tr., pp.457-479.) 
The jury found Ward guilty of rape and Ward pied guilty to the persistent 
violator enhancement. (R., pp.315, 338.) The court imposed a unified 20-year 
sentence with seven years fixed to run consecutive to a sentences Ward was 
serving in two other cases. (R., pp.349-353.) Ward filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.359-361.) 
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ISSUES 
Ward states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the use of the Appellant's testimony from a previously 
withdrawn guilty plea violate the fundamental constitutional 
rights of Appellant? 
2. Did the prosecution commit prosecutorial misconduct and in 
it's [sic] questioning of the defense witness? 
3. Did the Trial Court error [sic] in the admission of evidence 
over an objection as to chain of custody? 
4. Does the Cumulative Error Doctrine Apply? 
(Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief"), p.1.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ward failed to show fundamental error based upon the prosecutor's 
use of statements Ward made during his guilty plea colloquy to impeach 
him when he testified at trial? 
2. Has Ward failed to show the prosecutor committed misconduct? 
3. Has Ward failed to show the district court erred in admitting the DNA 
evidence? 
4. Since Ward has failed to show any error, does his claim of cumulative 




Ward Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Based On The Prosecutor's 
Proper Use Of I.RE. 410 To Impeach Him When Ward Testified At Trial 
Inconsistent With Statements He Made During His Guilty Plea Colloquy 
A. Introduction 
Ward claims, for the first time on appeal, that cross-examination of him 
with statements he made in conjunction with his guilty plea violated his 
"fundamental rights against self-incrimination and to effective assistance of 
counsel" since he was later allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.5.) Because Ward did not preserve this claim by objection below, 1 he 
must demonstrate the error is fundamental. Ward has failed to meet his burden. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010). 
C. The Proper Application Of I.RE. 410 Does Not Constitute Fundamental 
Error 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 41 O(a) states, in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the 
following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding admissible 
1 The only objection Ward raised below was relevance. (Tr., p.481, L.8.) 
7 
against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in 
the plea discussions: 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; [or] 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings 
under Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure or 
comparable Federal or state procedure regarding either of the 
foregoing pleas[.] 
Such statements are, however, admissible under certain circumstances. 
I.RE. 41 0(a). One such exception is that statements "made in the course of any 
proceedings under Rule 11" may be used for impeachment purposes "in the 
same criminal action or proceeding." I.RE. 41 0(b)(3). 
Pursuant to the exception set forth in I.RE. 41 0(b)(3), the state sought to 
impeach Ward, who testified at trial, with statements he made during his guilty 
plea colloquy that were inconsistent with his trial testimony. Specifically, the 
following exchange occurred as part of Ward's plea colloquy: 
THE COURT: To the charge set forth in the Amended Information 
that on or about May 22, 2011, in the County of Twin Falls, State of 
Idaho, that you penetrated the vaginal opening of a person named 
M.M., ... , a female person, with your penis, and where she 
resisted, but her resistance was overcome by force and violence, 
how do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Can you tell me in summary form what you did that 
makes you guilty of that charge? 
THE DEFENDANT: I had sex with [M.M.]. 
THE COURT: And did she resist? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
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THE COURT: And was that resistance overcome by force and 
violence on your part? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
(Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.14.) 
At trial, after Ward denied raping M.M. and instead claimed she asked him 
to have sex and asked him to bite her, choke her, and pull her hair (see generally 
Tr., pp.465-475), the prosecutor impeached Ward with the portions of his prior 
testimony in which he admitted M.M. resisted and that her resistance was 
overcome by force and violence on his part2 (Tr., p.487, L.25 - p.490, L.1 ). 
Ward does not actually challenge the admissibility of his statements under 
I.R.E. 41 0(b)(3). Instead, Ward notes the importance of a defendant's "Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination" and the "right to effective assistance 
of counsel" and asks the Court to adopt a rule, with these "concepts in mind," 
that requires a district court to determine as a prerequisite to admissibility under 
I.R.E. 410(b)(3), whether the statements were "voluntary" and "reliable." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) The question on appeal, however, is not whether 
1.R.E. 410 should be amended through judicial opinion; the question is whether 
Ward has demonstrated fundamental error in the district court's application of 
the rule to his case. Ward has failed to do so. 
2 To be clear, the prosecutor did not introduce evidence that Ward pied guilty. 
9 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that unpreserved claims of constitutional error3 are reviewed 
using a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). 
Ward has failed to satisfy any part of this test. Ward's reference to the 
existence of rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is insufficient to show 
an actual constitutional violation. With respect to the Fifth Amendment, Ward, 
relying on Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), argues "any statement used 
against a criminal defendant must be deemed voluntary." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.7.) Ward's reliance on Jackson is misplaced. Jackson only stands for the 
proposition that a conviction cannot be "founded, in whole or in part, upon an 
involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession." 
378 U.S. at 377. And, the more precise issue before the Court in Jackson was 
the state procedure that allowed a jury to determine the voluntariness of a 
confession after the trial judge made a "preliminary determination" that "the 
3 "[E]videntiary errors that simply involve violations of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence do not implicate constitutional considerations unless the error results in 
the defendant being deprived [of] his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process 
right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Dunlap, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 
4539806 *16 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted). 
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evidence presents a fair question as to [the confession's] voluntariness." 387 
U.S. at 377. The Court found such a procedure violates due process. Since 
Ward's statements during his guilty plea colloquy do not qualify as an allegedly 
coerced confession and Ward has failed to identify any unconstitutional 
procedure like the one condemned in Jackson, that case is inapposite. 
The case that is instructive in relation to Ward's Fifth Amendment claim is 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226 (1971). There, the Supreme Court 
held that statements made in violation of the Fifth Amendment right recognized 
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), can be used to impeach a defendant 
who testifies inconsistently with those statements at trial. As explained in Harris: 
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own 
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily 
taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak 
truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more 
than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary 
process [by asking the petitioner about contradictory statements he 
made to law enforcement]. Had inconsistent statements been 
made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be 
contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way 
of cross-examination and impeachment. 
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a 
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of 
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold, 
therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached 
by use of his earlier conflicting statements. 
401 U.S. at 225-226 (citations and footnote omitted). 
Ward does not cite Harris but instead relies heavily on the Colorado Court 
of Appeals' opinion in People v. Butler, 929 P.2d 36 (Colo Ct. App. 1996), to 
support his Fifth Amendment argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8). Ward's 
11 
reliance on Butler is also misplaced because the court in Butler was applying 
Colorado Rule of Evidence 410, which actually includes the language Ward 
seeks to impose upon I.R.E. 410. Colorado's rule provides, in pertinent part: 
[E]vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo 
contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the 
crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in any 
connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not 
admissible in any civil or criminal action, case, or proceeding 
against the person who made the plea or offer. This rule shall not 
apply to the introduction of voluntary and reliable statements made 
in court on the record in connection with any of the foregoing pleas 
or offers where offered for impeachment purposes. 
Butler at 40 (quoting CRE 410). 
Even assuming the "voluntary and reliable" requirement is of constitutional 
dimension such that I.R.E. 410 should be interpreted as requiring such a finding 
(as opposed to amending the rule to incorporate the requirement should the 
Idaho Supreme Court deem it appropriate), Ward has not established the 
statements he made as part of his guilty plea were, in fact, involuntary. That the 
district court allowed him to withdraw the plea itself based on his attorney's 
erroneous legal advice that had nothing to do with Ward's guilt or innocence, 
does not mean the statements made in relation thereto were not voluntary and 
reliable and Ward has cited no evidence to the contrary. Compare People v. 
McCormick, 881 P.2d 423 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) ("Promises made as part of a 
plea agreement are not inherently coercive or improper."); People v. Cole, 584 
P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1978) (citations omitted) ("no accused should be permitted to 
profit by falsifying testimony to obtain a favorable plea agreement and to mislead 
the court"). 
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Ward's reliance on the Sixth Amendment to satisfy the first prong of Perry 
is even more tenuous than his reliance on the Fifth Amendment in terms of 
establishing an actual constitutional violation. Ward's only argument in this 
regard is that "[a]llowing the use of the defendant's testimony, even for 
impeachment purposes, allows the State to continue the ineffective assistance of 
counsel experienced by Mr. Ward and violates his right to [sic] self-incrimination." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) As previously noted, Ward's right against self-
incrimination was not violated by impeaching him with his prior inconsistent 
statements, which is the assertion upon which his Sixth Amendment claim 
appears to be premised. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment issue that was 
addressed by the district court in relation to Ward's guilty plea was fully resolved 
when the court granted Ward relief by allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. 4 
Original counsel's erroneous advice related to the consequences of the rape 
charge in a different case, i.e., that the allegations could serve as the basis of a 
probation violation. Such advice did not render Ward's actual admissions during 
his plea colloquy involuntary or unreliable, it only meant his guilty plea was 
entered based on an erroneous understanding of the effects of such a plea. 
4 "[A] claim for ineffective assistance of counsel usually requires an evidentiary 
haring, and resolution of such claims can be difficult for an appellate court 
examining a trial record in which counsel's performance was not at issue." Smith 
v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009). Because the district 
court addressed counsel's performance in relation to Ward's guilty plea following 
the evidentiary hearing on Ward's motion to withdraw his plea, the state will 
assume, for the sake of argument, that the general rule precluding consideration 
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal does not prevent Ward 
from attempting to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation for purposes of the 
fundamental error analysis. 
13 
Thus, any cognizable Sixth Amendment concern did not "continue" just because 
Ward was not permitted to make inconsistent statements under oath once he 
proceeded to trial. 
Even if Ward could get past the first prong of Perry, he cannot 
demonstrate plain error. His argument to the contrary is a conclusory statement 
of his belief that "it is clear from the record that his rights were violated without 
his knowledge." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Not only is the record anything but 
"clear" that he suffered any constitutional violation, there is no clear or plain error 
because the district court correctly applied I.R.E. 410 as written. As the Court of 
Appeals held in State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 271 P.3d 1227 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citations and quotations omitted), "the inquiry is whether the error is clear under 
current law, or, ... whether the available authorities provide a clear answer to 
the question." It was not the district court's obligation to create new law in Idaho 
by sua sponte evaluating the constitutionality of a rule promulgated by the Idaho 
Supreme Court or by imposing requirements on the rule that do not exist. See 
State v. Trujillo, 605 P.2d 232, 235 (N.M. 1980) ("Rule 410 does not set up 
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standards of relevancy and trustworthiness, and we will not impose any on it."5) 
Nor was it incumbent on counsel to make a novel challenge to the 
constitutionality of the rule. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d 
1269, 1277 (2010) ("this Court will generally not find deficient performance where 
counsel fails to argue a novel theory in an undeveloped area of law"). This is 
particularly true given the principle recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court that 
"[t]he Rules of Evidence embody the balancing test which safeguards a 
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense along with protection of the 
state's interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process." State v. Meister, 148 
Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2009). 
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Ward to 
"demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P .3d at 978. With respect to the prejudice prong of 
the fundamental error test, Ward argues the trial court's comments at sentencing 
"that it was left with the belief that neither side told the whole story" demonstrate 
"any evidence can be significant in determining how much weight the jurors 
placed on such testimony." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Thus, Ward concludes, "[i]t 
5 Unlike I.RE. 410, New Mexico's Rule 410 provides no exceptions and the court 
in Trujillo declined the state's request to create a judicial exception to the rule 
that would allow for use of statements for purposes of impeachment even though 
the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Harris, supra, and the United States Senate's proposed version of F.R.E. 410, 
which "would have permitted 'voluntary statements made by a defendant in 
connection with pleas or plea negotiations [to] later be used to impeach him if he 
subsequently stood trial, took the stand, and testified inconsistently." Trujillo, 
605 P.2d at 234-235. 
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is difficult not to assume [his] testimony ... influenced the jury's finding of guilt." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Ward's argument fails. 
There was overwhelming evidence presented that Ward forcibly raped 
M.M. From M.M.'s distraught and tearful demeanor from the time she called 911 
through her contact with the first responders and hospital personnel, the injuries 
she sustained, and the scratches on Ward observed by law enforcement, it is 
difficult to imagine the jury reaching any conclusion other than that Ward was 
guilty of forcibly raping M.M. While Ward testified the act was consensual, his 
testimony was not believable not because he was impeached with his prior 
admissions but because it was inconsistent with the physical evidence. Further, 
to the extent the district court's comments at sentencing inform the analysis, 
contrary to Ward's claim on appeal, they do not favor him. 
The snippet upon which Ward relies, when read in context, related not to 
the actual act of rape but to other testimony about the events of the night, such 
as how much alcohol was consumed. (See Tr., p.520, L.20 - p.521, L.18.) As 
to the strength of the evidence of rape, the court stated: 
Obviously if a defendant believes in a sexual situation that 
he is having consensual relationships with someone, then likely, 
then logically that defendant would not contemplate his criminal 
conduct would cause or threaten harm. What's troubling in this 
case is that, frankly, the facts just don't support that. I don't think --
1 think that's why the jury convicted you. 
(Tr., p.520, Ls.7-14.) 
The court further commented: 
And there are, I guess in my view, different levels of rape. 
They are all unacceptable. They all have significant 
consequences, but the one that you have been convicted with in 
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this case, unfortunately, puts you in kind of what I consider the 
upper echelon of more egregious type of rapes because it's a 
forcible rape. The evidence in this case to this jury supports that 
conclusion. 
I don't know what this jury was thinking, but as I sat and 
listened to the evidence in this case, I had a hard time justifying in 
my own mind how this could have been a consensual encounter 
when [M.M.] ends up with the type of physical injuries that were 
described during the course of this trial. That's totally inconsistent 
to me with anything approaching consensual sex. 
I recognize - I don't know whether this is a situation that 
started off in a consensual way and got out of hand, or again, 
whether we just haven't heard all testimony or the truth of what 
occurred here. But again, it really doesn't matter because you 
stand convicted of a violent sexual offense. 
(Tr., p.526, L.18 - p.527, L.15.) 
Ward has failed to show any alleged error in the proper impeachment of 
him under I.R.E. 410 violated his substantial rights. Because Ward has not his 
met his burden under this prong or any other prong of Perry, he is not entitled to 
relief on his first claim. 
11. 
Ward Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Ward contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by trying to discredit 
a defense witness by "[i]nsinuating" he was "acting as a pimp" and by "mocking 
and making noises" in response to the witness's testimony. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10.) At trial, Ward requested a mistrial based on one of his claims of 
misconduct and objected to the other. (Tr., p.447, Ls.9-18, p.448, Ls.4-15, 
p.452, L.22 - p.453, L.10.) Review of the record and the applicable legal 
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standards shows Ward has failed to show misconduct, much less that he was 
entitled to a mistrial or is entitled to a new trial based on the conduct about which 
he complains. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing the denial of a motion for mistrial, "the question on 
appeal is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in light of 
circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made." State v. 
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _, 297 P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). "Instead, 
[the appellate court] examine[s] whether the event that precipitated the motion 
constituted reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record." kl 
(citations omitted). "The trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed 
only if [the event that triggered the mistrial motion], viewed retrospectively, 
amounted to reversible error." kl An error is not reversible if the "reviewing 
court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict." Id. 
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If the alleged error 
was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, the defendant bears the 
initial burden on appeal of establishing that the complained of conduct was 
improper. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59, 253 P.3d 727, 733 (2011 ); State 
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). "Where the defendant 
meets his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred, the State then has 
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the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." Perry, 150 
Idaho at 227-28, 245 P.3d at 979-80. 
C. Ward Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Request For A Mistrial 
In cross-examining defense witness Colby Redgrave, the prosecutor 
asked: "When you invited the two girls, Sonia and her cousin over, were you 
trying to get some girls for [Ward]?" (Tr., p.449, Ls.9-11.) Redgrave answered: 
"No, I wasn't. I had hung out with Sonia other than hanging out there. It wasn't 
anywhere around that way." (Tr., p.447, Ls.12-14.) Defense counsel then asked 
to approach and there was a "[s]idebar conference." (Tr., p.447, Ls.16-18.) 
After Redgrave was done testifying, the court allowed defense counsel to make a 
record regarding the subject of the sidebar, which was a request for a mistrial. 
(Tr., p.452, L.22 - p.453, L.3.) Defense counsel argued the prosecutor's 
question constituted misconduct because, according to counsel, it "essentially" 
asked if Redgrave "was pimping for the defendant to get women over there." 
(Tr., p.453, Ls.4-8.) Defense counsel further argued it was not "relevant" and 
was "done to inflame the passions of the jury." (Tr., p.453, Ls.8-9.) The 
prosecutor responded to the accusation as follows: 
... I certainly don't believe that it was prosecutorial misconduct. 
It's certainly relevant to this matter. He did invite two girls over 
there. There has been a lot of discussion about those two girls. I 
wanted to know why he would have invited those two girls over 
there when his ex-girlfriend was there. The testimony has been 
she was trying to get back into a relationship with [Redgrave]. 
There has been some conflicting testimony, I believe, as to who 
was trying to get back into the relationship, but I certainly think that 
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it's proper inquiry to determine what the motive was for having 
those two girls come over. 
(Tr., p.453, Ls.12-24.) 
The court denied the motion for mistrial, stating: 
Well, the question that was asked didn't involve the use of 
the word pimping for starters. I didn't, frankly, take the question 
that way either. I thought that counsel was asking again, as she 
just, as Madam Prosecutor said, what was the motive for doing 
that. I'm not sure that's particularly relevant in this case, but I don't 
see it as prosecutorial misconduct. 
(Tr., p.454, Ls.5-12.) 
On appeal, Ward argues that "[i]nsinuating that Mr. Redgrave was acting 
as a pimp to get some girls is totally indefensible. There was no evidence to 
support such a charge." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Contrary to Ward's argument, 
and as noted by the district court, the prosecutor insinuated no such thing. That 
counsel chose to interpret the question in such a way does not make the 
question itself inappropriate or misconduct. Further, there was evidence, beyond 
the fact of the rape itself, that Ward was interested in "trying to get some girls." 
The state presented evidence that Ward sent Redgrave a message on May 22, 
2011, at 3:54 a.m., approximately 12 minutes after M.M. called 911, which read: 
"Nice dude that f'n bitch is f'n pscho ur right sinona [sic6] is way better cooler[.] 
holy shit[.]" (Tr., p.416, Ls.20-21 (911 call at 3:42 a.m.); p.486, L.5 - p.487, L.2.; 
6 Presumably "[S]inona" refers to Sonia, the girl who came over to Ward's with 
her cousin earlier in the evening at Redgrave's invitation. Redgrave admitted he 
also had previously had an intimate relationship with Sonia. (Tr., p.431, Ls.14-
16.) 
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Exhibit 38 (verbatim).) 
Ward has failed to show error in the denial of his motion for mistrial. 
D. Ward Has Failed To Show Error In The Court's Response To His Claim 
That The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Allegedly "Mocking" And 
"Making Noises" In Response To Redgrave's Testimony 
In further cross-examining Redgrave, the following exchange occurred: 
Q: And you left [M.M.] there with [Ward] alone; correct? 
A. Yes, momentarily. 
Q: Momentarily. And it's your --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, we would request the prosecutor 
not make gratuitous comments and noises in front of the jury. 
THE COURT: I didn't observe anything. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She, just for the record, Judge, she 
laughed and said "momentarily" like she was mocking the witness. 
THE COURT: So noted. 
(Tr., p.448, Ls.4-15.) 
On appeal, Ward complains that "mocking and making noises at a witness 
diminishes the credibility of a witness." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Ward's 
argument, of course, presupposes the prosecutor mocked Redgrave or made 
noises - something the district court did not observe. Nor does the record reflect 
what sort of "noises" the prosecutor supposedly made. On this record, there is 
no basis for a finding of misconduct. Further, while Ward claims on appeal that 
the alleged mocking and noise-making was part of his request for a mistrial 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9), the record does not support that assertion. The sidebar 
at which counsel requested a mistrial preceded defense counsel's "objection" to 
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the "gratuitous comments and noises" and the record defense counsel made 
regarding his motion did not reference the "mocking or noises." (Tr., p.447, L.18 
(sidebar conference), p.448, Ls.8-10 ("objection" to "gratuitous comments and 
noises"), p.453, Ls.4-10 (argument on motion for mistrial).) The only relief Ward 
requested in relation to the "gratuitous comments and noises" was that the 
prosecutor not do it. (Tr., p.448, Ls.8-10.) Even assuming the prosecutor did 
what defense counsel claimed, she apparently stopped "do[ing] it" because 
counsel never again objected to such conduct. 
Even if Ward could meet his burden of showing prosecutorial misconduct 
in the first instance, he is not entitled to a new trial on this basis because the 
alleged misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. As previously noted, 
the evidence that Ward raped M.M. was incredibly strong. Whether Redgrave 
was credible in his testimony that he only "momentarily" left Ward's before 
supposedly coming back and parking nearby so he could supposedly watch M.M. 
leave voluntarily with Ward was hardly significant to the jury's determination of 
what happened between Ward and M.M. on the side of the road where there 
were no witnesses. Thus, even assuming any prosecutorial error, the error was 
harmless. 
111. 
Ward Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of The DNA Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Ward argues admission of the DNA evidence was erroneous because, he 
claims, the state failed to establish a proper chain of custody. (Appellant's Brief, 
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p.10.) This Court should decline to consider Ward's claim because he failed to 
support it with argument and authority. Even if considered, Ward has failed to 
show evidentiary error in the admission of the DNA evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A trial court's determination that evidence is supported by a proper 
foundation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 
643, 977 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 757, 
838 P.2d 885, 886 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
C. Ward Has Failed To Show Error In Admission Of The DNA Evidence 
Following the rape, M.M. was transported to the hospital where a nurse 
conducted a sexual assault exam and collected swabs from M.M.'s vagina, 
abdomen, and shoulder. (Tr., p.311, L.17 - p.314, L.19.) The purpose of those 
swabs was to "collect DNA evidence." (Tr., p.313, L.21.) Once collected, the 
nurse placed the swabs in envelopes and placed the envelopes in a sealed box. 
(Tr., p.314, Ls.22-24, p.319, Ls.9-12; Exhibit 23 (sexual assault kit).) The nurse 
testified that, after the box is sealed, she "fill[s] out a chain of custody form and 
then hand[s] it to the officer and they [sic] sign the chain of custody form." (Tr., 
p.317, Ls.18-20.) 
Evidence technician Ronald McKinlay testified he received the sexual 
assault kit, which was identified as Exhibit 23, from Detective Becky White on 
May 22, 2011. (Tr., p.347, Ls.4-19, p.348, Ls.4-5.) Upon receiving the kit, 
McKinlay placed a label on the outside and placed it into evidence. (Tr., p.347, 
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Ls.12-15.) McKinlay testified that when he received the kit, the seals were intact 
because "the seal has to be on there before [he will] even accept it into 
evidence." (Tr., p.347, L.24 - p.348, L.12.) The day after McKinlay placed the 
kit into evidence, he "sent it to the Meridian ISP lab for testing." (Tr., p.348, 
Ls.13-17.) 
Kerry Russell, an employee at the Idaho State Police Forensic Service 
Laboratory explained, in detail, the protocol for receiving evidence at the lab and 
testified that when she received the kit, "[i]t was evidence tape sealed" and the 
seal was intact. (Tr., p.358, L.15 - p.2, p.365, L.19 - p.366, L.4.) Russell then 
explained the procedures for testing the swabs contained in the kit and for 
repackaging upon completion of testing. (Tr., p.366, L.14 - p.371, L.18.) 
Another lab employee, Stacy Guess, also testified to the procedures she used in 
conducting the DNA analysis. (See generally Tr., pp.379-387.) 
For comparison purposes, Ward submitted an "oral buccal swab (saliva 
sample) on 5/22/11 which was sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for 
testing." (R., p.285.) Ward stipulated prior to trial that "[n]o additional foundation 
w[ould] be necessary to prove that the sample [he] provided was the sample sent 
to the Lab in this case." (R., p.285.) The court read the stipulation to the jury at 
trial. (Tr., p.395, Ls.3-8.) 
The DNA from the swabs matched the DNA sample submitted by Ward. 
(Tr., p.387, Ls.3-22.) 
During Guess's testimony, there was a bench conference "with regard to 
[Ward's] objections and concerns regarding the chain of custody." (Tr., p.421, 
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Ls.16-20.) The court told defense counsel "at the bench that [it] was going to 
overrule those and [it] did, but [it] would give [counsel] an opportunity to make a 
record of what that objection was, which was timely." (Tr., p.421, Ls.20-23.) 
Defense counsel then made the following record: 
We stipulated with the state that the oral swab taken from 
the defendant, that the court read the stipulation that required no 
further foundation it was taken from the defendant and sent to the 
lab. The other evidence that was tested by the lab and testified 
about from the DNA expert we did not stipulate to that. So there 
was, our argument is, a break in the chain of custody there 
because the state did not establish the adequate foundation to 
show how it got into the hands, okay, the evidence was taken from 
the nurse ... at the hospital. 
[The evidence] ended up in the evidence locker at the Twin 
Falls County Sheriff's Office. We don't know what happened to it in 
the interim, if anything happened to it in the interim, and so the 
chain of custody was not established there. 
So our objection was essentially foundation and chain of 
custody that this should not have been placed before the jury 
because a critical person that handled all of this, collected all of this 
was Detective Becky White, who did not testify in this trial, and we 
did not get the chance to examine her. The state cannot lay the 
proper foundation with [sic] her, and we did not have the right to 
confrontation as far as how she handled this evidence. 
(Tr., p.422, L.2 - p.423, L.2.) 
The court overruled Ward's objection noting that although there was a 
"technical gap in the chain of custody ... as to who transported from the hospital 
to the evidence locker," the evidence was sealed when it arrived at the evidence 
locker and there was "no evidence ... that the seals were broken." (Tr., p.423, 
Ls.3-25.) 
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On appeal, Ward reasserts his position that the state could not establish a 
chain of custody without the testimony of Detective White.7 This Court should 
decline to consider Ward's claim because he has failed to support it with any 
authority. The only authority Ward offers is the abuse of discretion standard of 
review applicable to evidentiary issues and a single reference to I.R.E. 901 that 
appears in his concluding sentence: "Without Detective White's testimony, the 
chain was not established as required by I.R.E. 901 and the evidence should not 
have been admitted." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Nowhere in his brief does Ward 
explain what is required for admission under I.R.E. 901 nor does he cite any 
case law to support his assertion that Detective White's testimony was 
necessary in order to admit the evidence. This Court should, therefore, decline 
to consider Ward's claim of evidentiary error. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family 
Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 (2010) (citations omitted) ("Where an 
appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support 
his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite 
to be heard by the Court. A general attack on the findings and conclusions of 
the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is 
insufficient to preserve an issue."). 
7 It appears Detective White was not called as a witness at trial because she was 
terminated from the Twin Fall County Sheriff's Offfice. In fact, Ward filed a 
motion in limine to prevent her from testifying on that basis. (R., p.253.) And, 
Ward's stipulation in relation to his saliva swab was because Detective White 
collected the sample from him and he did not want to be re-tested. (Tr., p.89, 
L.6 - p.90, L.18.) However, Ward declined to stipulate to foundation for any 
other DNA evidence. (Tr., p.90, Ls.5-18.) 
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Even if considered, Ward's claim fails. Idaho Rule of Evidence 901 
states, in part: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." "Often, the party 
offering evidence establishes the chain of custody in order to create a 
presumption that it was not materially altered during the chain of custody." State 
v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 647, 977 P.2d 905, 909 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations 
omitted). "The burden then shifts to the defendant to overcome the presumption, 
and the defendant must make some showing that the evidence was tampered or 
meddled with." kl "Mere speculation that the evidence was mishandled or 
tampered with is insufficient to establish a break in the chain of custody." State v. 
Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 758, 838 P.2d 885, 887 (Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, 
"[p]roof of the chain of custody is a means by which identity of an exhibit may be 
established and by which the standard of admissibility can be satisfied; it is not, 
of itself, a separate requisite for admissibility." Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 647, 977 
P.2d at 909 (citation omitted). 
"Generally, in laying a proper foundation for the admission of test results 
of a blood sample the practicalities of proof do not require the prosecution to 
negate all possibilities of substitution or tampering." Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 647, 
977 P.2d at 909 (citations omitted). State v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437, 354 P.2d 
751 (1960), is instructive. "In Coburn, the evidence established that the doctor 
drew the blood and gave it to a nurse, who sealed it, marked it, and gave it to the 
sheriff." Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 647, 977 P.2d at 909 (discussing Coburn, supra). 
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"The sheriff then took the samples to the [hospital], delivering them to a nurse 
who said she would put them into the refrigerator for the technician." Coburn, 82 
Idaho at 447. "The following morning, the witness Veibell took those blood 
samples labeled 'Max Coburn' from the refrigerator and performed the required 
tests thereon." ~ The Court stated: "Although the testimony of the person 
receiving the blood samples at the hospital is absent from the record, 
nevertheless the circumstances sufficiently disclose the identification of the 
samples tested as being those drawn from appellant." ~ The Court further 
noted the absence of "any evidence which would cast the slightest inference that 
any irregularity occurred after the samples were delivered to the hospital by [the 
sheriff]. Therefore, such evidence was properly admitted." ~ 
Similarly, in Gilpin "there was a detailed explanation regarding hospital 
procedure and protocol" in and Gilpin "failed to offer any evidence that her blood 
samples were tampered with or plausibly suggest the same from the record." 
Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 648, 977 P.2d at 910. Rather, Gilpin's only complaint was 
that "the hospital personnel who handled her blood were unable to independently 
recollect the circumstances surrounding its chain of custody." ~ This was 
insufficient to "suppress" the blood test results. ~ at 649, 977 P.2d at 911. 
As in Coburn and Gilpin, the lack of testimony from Detective White 
regarding her transportation of the kit from the hospital to the evidence 
technician was not necessary to lay adequate foundation for admission of the 
test results and, as found by the district court, there was no evidence of 
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tampering. Ward's claim that the district court erred in admitting the DNA test 
results fails. 
Even if Ward could establish error in the admission of the DNA evidence, 
any error was harmless given that Ward admitted having intercourse with M.M. 
and admitted biting her. Since the only purpose of the DNA was to prove what 
Ward himself admitted, any error in its admission was harmless. 
IV. 
Ward Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
Ward argues that, even if "none of the errors are sufficient to justify 
reversal, [he] believes that the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Ward's argument fails because he has failed to show 
that the cumulative effect of the errors he preserved deprived him of a fair trial. 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P .2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). The cumulative 
error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). 
Even where there are two or more preserved errors, the presence of such 
errors alone does not necessarily require reversal of a conviction. State v. 
Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 725, 249 P.3d 1169, 1180 (Ct. App. 2010). "[T]he 
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Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,681 (1986). 
Because Ward has failed demonstrate any error, much less two or more 
preserved errors, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Ward guilty of rape. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2013. 
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